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Abstract:  Operations of mobile ad hoc networks rely on the collaboration of participating 
nodes to route data for each other.  This standard approach using a fixed set of nodes for each 
communication link cannot cope with high mobility due to a high frequency of link breaks.  A 
recent approach based on virtual routers has been proposed to address this problem.  In this 
new environment, virtual routers are used for forwarding data.  The functionality of each virtual 
router is provided by the mobile devices currently within its spatial proximity.  Since these 
routers do not move, the communication links are much more robust compared to those of the 
conventional techniques.  In this paper, we investigate techniques to enforce collaboration 
among mobile devices by identify and punish misbehaving users in supporting the virtual router 
functionality.  Simulation results based on various system configurations are given.  They 
indicate that the proposed technique is effective.  
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1 Introduction  
Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) have attracted great research interest in recent 
years.  A mobile ad hoc network is a self-organizing multi-hop wireless network where 
all hosts (often called nodes) participate in the routing and data forwarding process.  
The deployment of ad hoc networks does not rely on fixed infrastructures such as 
router and base station, thereby posing a critical requirement on the nodes to 
cooperate with each other for successful data transmission.  Many works (e.g., 
[Buchegger, 02], [Buttyan, 00], and [Jiang, 05]) have pointed out that the impact of 
malicious and selfish users must be carefully investigated. Existing cooperation 
enforcement techniques ([Buchegger, 02], [Buttyan, 00], [Jiang, 05], [Karp, 00], 
[Marti, 00], and [Michiardi, 02]) cannot be adapted for some of recent advance in 
routing protocols.  In particular, we are interested in the new Connectionless-Oriented 
Approach [Ho, 04] and [Fubler, 03].  We investigate two such techniques, namely 
Connectionless Approach (CLA) [Ho, 04] and Contention-Based Forwarding (CBF) 
[Fubler, 03], in this paper.  These techniques do not maintain a hop-by-hop route for a 
communication session to minimize the occurrence of broken link. In CLA, the 
network area is divided into non-overlapping grid cells, each serving as a virtual 
router.  Any physical router (i.e., mobile host), currently inside a virtual router, can 
help forward the data packet to the next virtual router along the virtual link.  This 
process is repeated until the packet reaches its final destination.  Since a virtual link is 
based on virtual routers which do not move, it is much more robust than physical link.  
Another scheme, CBF, simply forwards data packets to the next hop without first 
having to establish the one-hop connection.  The nodes that happen to be in the 
general direction towards the destination node help to forward the data packets.  
The goal of this research is to address the cooperation issue for connectionless-
oriented approach (i.e., CBF [Fubler, 03] and CLA [Ho, 04]) in wireless ad hoc 
networks.  There can be both selfish and malicious nodes in a mobile ad hoc network.  
The selfish nodes are most concerned about their energy consumption and 
intentionally drop packets to save power.  The purpose of malicious node is to attack 
network using various intrusive techniques.  In general, nodes in an ad hoc network 
can exhibit Byzantine behaviors.  That is, they can drop, modify, or misroute data 
packets.  As a result, the availability and robustness of the networks are severely 
compromised.  Many works ([Buchegger, 02], [Buttyan, 00], [Jiang, 05], [Karp, 00], 
[Marti, 00], and [Michiardi, 02]) have been published to combat such problem - 
misbehaving nodes are detected and a routing algorithm is employed to avoid and 
penalize misbehaving nodes.   These techniques, however, cannot be applied to the 
connectionless-oriented approach since any node in the general direction towards the 
destination node can potentially help forward the data packets. 
The primary contributions of this paper are as follows: 
? We introduce a cooperation enforcement technique, called 3CE (3-Counter 
Enforcement), for the connectionless-oriented approach.  
? We apply the 3CE method to two connectionless-oriented techniques: 
- Connectionless Approach (CLA), and 
- Contention-Based Forwarding (CBF). 
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? We present simulation results to show that with the 3CE features, CLA and CBF 
can prevent malicious nodes and enforce the cooperation among nodes to 
maintain the good performance of the network. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  We review the different 
connectionless-oriented protocols and different cooperation enforcement techniques in 
Section 2. We discuss the node configuration and present our cooperation enforcement 
techniques for connectionless-oriented techniques in Section 3. We give simulation 
results in Section 4 to demonstrate the benefits of the proposed techniques. Finally, we 
draw conclusion on this work in Section 5.  
2 Related Work 
In this section, we first briefly describe two connectionless-oriented techniques, 
namely CLA and CBF.  We then review existing collaboration enforcement methods. 
2.1 Connectionless-Oriented Routing Protocols  
A good routing algorithm for MANETs must adapt to traffic patterns with minimal 
overhead. To reduce network flooding, routing protocols can leverage location 
information obtained from GPS (Global Positioning System) or other location 
services.  For instance, LAR [Ko, 98] uses location information to limit the area of 
flooding, subsequently reducing route request messages.  These schemes result in 
better power conservation and improve network scalability. To address mobility 
issues, hop-by-hop approaches, such as TBF [Niculescu, 03], TMNR [Blazevic, 05], 
and GPSR [Karp, 00], have been proposed. In those approaches, the node only needs 
to establish the connection to the next hop before forwarding the data.  To determine 
the next hop, a node compares the distances of its neighbor nodes to the destination 
node (i.e., GPSR), the next waypoint (i.e., TMNR), or a trajectory (i.e., TBF). 
CBF [Fubler, 03] and CLA [Ho, 04] are more recent routing techniques for 
MANETs.  While GPRS, TMNR, and TBF need to establish a connection to the next 
hop before forwarding a data packet, CBF and CLA simply forward data packets to 
the next hop without first having to establish the one-hop connection.  We classify 
these schemes as Connectionless-Oriented Approach. In CBF, a node forwards the 
packets as a single-hop broadcast to all neighbors. The neighbors compete with each 
other for the “right” to forward the packet. During this contention period, a node 
determines how well it itself is suited as a next hop for the packet.  The node that wins 
the contention suppresses the other nodes, thus establishes itself as the next 
forwarding node. This contention is based on the distance of the nodes to the 
destination (see Figure 1(a)).  For example, if node j and node k received a data packet 
from node i (see Figure 1(b)). Both node j and node k will calculate a contention (e.g., 
delay) timer according to their respective distances, Dist j d and Dist k d, to destination 
node d.  In this case, node k’s timer expires first (i.e., Dist j d < Dist k d) and broadcasts 
the data packet to the next node.  This will cancel node j’s timer to prevent multiple 
next hops and packet duplication.  
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Figure 1. Contention-Based Forwarding.  
In CLA ([Ho, 04] and [Ho, 07]), the network area is divided into small non-
overlapping grid cells (see Figure 1(a)). Instead of maintaining a hop-by-hop route 
between the source and destination node, the source selects a list of grid cells that 
form a “connecting” path between the source and destination. From a different 
perspective, each grid cell can be viewed as a virtual router in the sense that any 
physical router (i.e., a mobile node) currently within the virtual router can alternate in 
forwarding data toward the next virtual router.  The communication path consisting of 
consecutive virtual routers form a virtual link (see Figure 1(a)).   For example, if node 
j and node k received a data packet from node i (see Figure 1(b)).  Both node j and 
node k are within the radio range of the sender, node i.  However, node k is farther 
away, and therefore has a shorter forwarding delay.  As a result, node k will forward 
the data packet from node i. In this paper, we use the terms “virtual router” and “grid 
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cell” interchangeably.  Similarly, we also use the terms “virtual link” and “forwarding 
grid path” interchangeably. 
Given a virtual router, its physical routers compete to forward the data packets 
according to a data forwarding procedure.  This function computes a shorter delay for 
a node farther from the sender and closer to the destination.  In this environment, a 
virtual link is considered broken if one of its virtual routers becomes empty.  This is 
addressed by replacing the empty virtual router with a neighboring virtual router.  The 
fundamental advantages of CLA are twofold.  First, a virtual link is much less likely to 
become broken than a standard route used in conventional connection-oriented 
techniques; and second, unlike standard routes, the robustness of virtual link is not 
sensitive to the mobility inherent in MANET. Since both CBF and CLA can robustly 
support high mobility, these two schemes have been adapted for vehicle-to-vehicle 
environment. 
 
 
(a) 
Dist j
 
(b) 
Figure 2. Connectionless Approach.  
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2.2 Cooperation Enforcement Techniques 
There are several Cooperation Enforcement Techniques to deter misbehaving nodes. 
We introduce some of them in this section. In Zhou and Hass [Zhou, 99], authors 
employ asynchronous threshold security and share refreshing for distributed 
certification authorities for key management in mobile ad-hoc networks.  They take 
advantage of inherent redundancies in mobile ad hoc networks given by multiple 
routes to enable diversity coding, allowing for Byzantine failures give by several 
corrupted node or collusions. The approach is a potentially strong prevention 
mechanism; however, to the best of our knowledge, the impact on performance of a 
large scale network and ability to adapt to high mobility has not been published. 
Smith, Murthy, and Garcia-Luna-Aceves [Smith 97] examine the routing security 
of distance vector protocols in general and develop countermeasures for 
vulnerabilities by protecting both routing messages and routing update. They propose 
sequence numbers and digital signatures for both routing messages and updates.  
However, distance vector protocols are not suitable to large scale and high mobility 
network as studied in CBF [Fubler, 03] and CLA [Ho, 04].   And it is difficult to 
employ [Smith 97] in such a network environment and to adapt to new types of 
routing protocols. 
Buttyan and Hubaux propose incentives to corporation by means of so-called 
nuggets [Buttyan, 00]. Nuggets serve as a per-hop payment in every packet or counter 
to the secure module in each node to encourage forwarding. Similar approach called 
Confidant protocol proposed by Buchegger and Le Boudec [Buchegger, 02] which 
propagates the bad reputation of node to more than one node.  However, this type of 
approaches cannot be employed by connectionless-oriented approach for the following  
reasons: First, malicious nodes can easily cheat the proposed protocols by creating and 
forwarding packets to a none-existing node or a random node to increase the nuggets 
or the counters since there is no pre-determined route or a next hop in connectionless-
oriented approach.  Second, in large scale networks, the connections between two 
nodes can have large number of hops.  Thus, to establish a connection might be very 
costly or not affordable to some nodes in terms of nuggets.   
Marti, Giuli, Lai, and Baker [Marti, 00] observe increased throughput in mobile 
ad-hoc network by complementing DSR with a watchdog (for detection of malicious 
behavior) and a ‘pathrater’ (for trust management and routing policy, every path used 
is rated), which enable nodes to avoid malicious nodes in their routes.  Their approach 
does not punish malicious nodes that do not cooperate, but rather relieves them from 
the burden of forwarding for other.  In other words, the malicious nodes are rewarded 
in their behavior. Jiang, Sheu, Hua, and Ozyer [Jiang, 05] proposed a finite-state 
model to penalize the misbehavior nodes and allow them to rejoin only if the behavior 
improved. However, in Connectionless Approach (CLA) and Contention-Based 
Forwarding (CBF), there is no pre-determining next hop.  Thus, it is impossible to 
employ a misbehavior detection mechanism (i.e., watchdog) and a malicious node 
avoidance routing protocol (i.e., path rater).  
Yi, Naldburg, and Kravets [Yi, 01] propose a modification of AODV with 
security metrics to path computation and selection. They define trust levels according 
to organizational hierarchies with a shared key for each level, so that nodes can state 
their security requirements when requesting a route and only nodes that meet these 
1095Ho Y.H., Ho A.H., Hua K.A., Xie F.: Cooperation Enforcement ...
requirements can participate in the routing.  Again, it is not suitable to connectionless 
based approach due to no per-determined route or selection process for a route.  
3 3-Counters Enforcement (3CE) for Collaboration in 
Connectionless-Oriented Protocols 
In this section, we first briefly describe the configuration of mobile nodes and their 
Tamper Proof Module. We then present our cooperation enforcement techniques, 
called 3CE, for connectionless-oriented techniques.  
3.1 Node Configuration and Tamper Proof Module 
The proposed technique is based on nodes with the following configuration.  First, 
nodes are equipped with wireless interface cards that can be switched to detection 
mode to “detect” data transmission on a “suspicious” node in their proximities.  
Second, connectionless-oriented routing protocol is employed in the network layer.  
Without loss of generality, we base our discussion on the more recent techniques 
developed for routing in MANETs (i.e., Connectionless Approach routing protocol 
(CLA) [Ho, 04] and Contention-Based Forwarding (CBF) [Fubler, 03]).  
Nevertheless, the technique can be incorporated into any location-aid protocols to 
protect nodes against uncooperative behaviors. Third, reliable communication 
protocols such as TCP cannot be employed in this type of routing protocols.  While 
TMNR and TBF need to maintain (proactively or reactively) neighbor nodes location 
information and establish a connection to the next hop before forwarding a data 
packet, CBF and CLA simply forward data packet without first establishing the link to 
the next node.  Any node that happens to be in the general direction towards the 
destination node can compete for the “right” to forward data packets.   
In addition, similar to the techniques presented in [Buttyan, 00] and [Jiang, 05], 
we also equip each node with a tamper resistant module.  All other hardware and 
software components are susceptible to illicit modifications.  We notice that a tamper-
proof security module remains controversial [Pfitzmann, 97], but it proves to be 
inevitable in a large scale and high mobility network environment. Our approach 
guarantees that as long as the tamper resistant module is not compromised, nodes 
cannot benefit from uncooperative behaviors.  Some mission critical data is stored in 
the tamper resistant module.  This information include: 1) a unique ID of the node; 2) 
a pair of public/private keys; 3) a Forward Request Counter that counts number of 
packets that are received and need to be forwarded; 4) a Forward Counter that counts 
number of packets have been forwarded; 5) a Location Discovery Counter that counts 
number of Location Discovery packets initiated by a node; 6) a Session Table that 
keeps track ongoing communication sessions; 7) a Counter Update Procedure that 
updates the three counters; 8) a Misbehavior Detection Procedure that initiates the 
detection to identify a malicious node.  Since the tamper proof module maintains 
information of three counters that are used to determine maliciousness of a node and 
initiate the detection, hereafter we also refer to this module as the 3C Module, and the 
proposed technique as the 3CE or 3C Enforcement technique. 
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 Figure 3. Layer Structure.  
The 3C Module inspects Location Discovery packets, Location Reply packets and 
data packets exchange between the network layer and the MAC layer (see Figure 3); 
and the module updates the counters as follows:  
1. When a new packet arrives at a non-destination node, it updates (i.e., 
increment by one) its Forward Request Counter;   
2. When a node forward a packet, it updates (i.e., increment by one) its 
Forward Counter; and   
3. When a note initiates a Location Discovery packet, it updates (i.e., increment 
by one) it’s Location Discovery Counter.   
In addition, the 3C Module constructs and adds 3C’s header (i.e., the value of three 
counters) to the Location Discovery packet as in various layers of the OSI model. 
3.2 3C Module 
In a connection-oriented (i.e., hop by hop route) approach, before a node can start a 
data transmission session to another node, the protocol needs to issue a route request 
to find a route to the destination node. However, in connectionless-oriented approach, 
only the location of the destination node is needed.  Thus, a Location Discovery 
packet is broadcasted to find only the destination’s location. Once its location is 
determined, intermediate nodes can forward data packet according to the general 
direction towards the destination; and all packets exchanged between nodes are 
examined by the nodes’ 3C Module.  
In a 3C Module, three counters (i.e., Forward Request Counter, Forward 
Counter, and Location Discovery Counter) are updated according to the counter 
update procedure. These counters are maintained by the node’s own 3C Module (see 
Figure 3).  Similar to [Buttyan, 00] and [Jiang, 05], we assume the 3C Module is a 
tamper resistant module that malicious users cannot contaminate it. The details of the 
counters update procedure will be discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4.  
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When a source node S initiates a Location Discovery packet,  node S’s 3C Module 
adds the 3C’s header to the Location Discovery packet as in various layers of the OSI 
model.  3C header contains the value of three counters (i.e., Forward Request 
Counter, Forward Counter, and Location Discovery Counter) of node S.  Based on 
this header, neighboring nodes of S can decide to forward or discard the Location 
Discovery packet. If a node n “suspects” the source node S is misbehaved, n invokes 
its Misbehavior Detection Procedure.  A node suspects another node is misbehaving 
if one of the following is true: a) the Forward Ratio (i.e., ratio of Forward Counter to 
Forward Request Counter) of S falls below the Forward Ratio of n; or b) the Request 
Ratio (i.e., ratio of the Location Discovery Counter to Forward Counter) of S rises 
above the Request Ratio of n.  If so, n exchanges 3C information (i.e., the value of the 
three counters) with its neighboring nodes to determine the network condition in the 
local area (i.e., n’s neighboring nodes).  If the source node S is identified (by 
Misbehavior Detection Procedure) as misbehaving, its neighboring nodes will 
penalize this node by not forwarding S’s Location Discovery packets.   
In order for malicious nodes to rejoin the network, non-malicious nodes still allow 
malicious nodes to participate in forwarding data.  Unlike many techniques that avoid 
the malicious nodes during the routing procedure, our approach allows malicious 
nodes to rejoin the network by contributing its share (i.e., forwarding data for others) 
of network workload.  This way, nodes are given more incentive to act collaboratively.  
By forwarding data packets for other nodes, a malicious node can increase its 
Forward Counter.  When its ratio of Forward Request Counter to Forward Counter 
rises above threshold α and its ratio of Location Discovery Counter to Forward 
Counter fells below threshold β, the malicious node will again be allowed to join the 
network, i.e., its neighboring nodes again help forward its Location Discovery packets.  
We elaborate the above processes in the following sections. 
3.3 Counters Update during the Location Discovery Phase 
As mentioned earlier, a node needs to find the location of the destination before it can 
start to send data packets in connectionless-oriented protocols such as CBF and CLA.  
A node can initiate a Location Discovery procedure, receive a Location Discovery 
packet, or forward/reply a Location Discovery packet.  To initiate a Location 
Discovery procedure, a source node broadcasts a Location Discovery packet.  
Location Discovery packet: Location Discovery packet contains the following 
information: source node ID (source_ID), source node’s location (S_cell_ID), 
destination node ID (destination_ID), destination node’s location (D_cell_ID), 
forward node ID (forward_ID), and forward node’s location (F_cell_ID).  
When a node receives a Location Discovery packet, it checks if it is the 
destination node.  If so, it returns a Location Reply packet that contains its location 
(D_cell_ID); otherwise, if the node did not see this Location Discovery packet before, 
it adds its ID and its cell ID (i.e., forward node ID - forward_ID and the currently 
location - F_cell_ID) and broadcasts the Location Discovery packet to other nodes.  In 
Figure 4, we show the data forwarding procedure for CLA in Routing Layer.  The 
same procedure can be applied to CBF.  
Session Table: Each node maintains a Session Table in its 3C Module to track all 
the ongoing communication session.  An ongoing communication session is identified 
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by a session_ID which is a pair of source_ID and destination_ID of the 
communication session. This table contains the following information for each entry 
(i.e., communication session): session_ID (i.e., a pair of source_ID and 
destination_ID) and a time to live (TTL) timer.  An entry is deleted from the Session 
Table when one of the following information is true: (i) A communication session 
ended; (ii) Entry’s TTL (time to live) timer expired; (iii) Entry belongs to an identified 
malicious node.  An entry’s TTL timer is reset when a packet received such that: a) the 
packet corresponds to this entry (i.e., source_ID and destination_ID = session_ID) 
and; b) it is not from a malicious node.    
3.3.1 Initiate Location Discovery 
When a Location Discovery procedure in the routing layer passes an initiated 
Location Discovery packet to the 3C Module, it processes the packet and updates the 
Location Discover Counter as follows (see Figure 4): 
1. The 3C Module determines if this Location Discovery packet belongs to one 
of the initiator’s (i.e., the source node’s) ongoing communication session in 
the Session Table.  If it does not belong to an ongoing session, go to Step 2; 
otherwise, go to Step 3.   
2. The 3C Module increments the Location Discovery Counter by one and adds 
it to the Session Table (and go to Step 3). 
3. The 3C Module adds a 3C header containing the values of the three counters 
(i.e., Forward Request Counter, Forward Counter, and Location Discovery 
Counter) to this Location Discovery packet before passing it to the MAC 
Layer for broadcast to other nodes. 
In the connectionless-oriented approach, the destination of a communication session is 
periodically updated according to the mobility of the destination node.  The location 
of the source node is updated by piggybacking the location information in the data 
packets.  However, a source node sometime needs to re-discover the location of a 
destination node due to packet losses caused by congestion, mobility, or channel 
errors.  Thus, we differentiate between the initial location discovery and the location 
discovery that is re-establishing an ongoing communication session.  
3.3.2 Receive Location Discovery Packet 
When a Location Discovery packet broadcast from a node m to any of its one-hop 
neighbor node n, n’s MAC Layer passes the packet to its 3C Module for processing 
the Location Discovery packet and updating the Forward Request Counter as follow 
(see Figure 4): 
1. The 3C Module determines if m is the source node that initiated this Location 
Discovery packet (i.e., packet’s source_ID = forward_ID). If so, go to Step 2; 
otherwise, go to Step 3. 
2. If m is the source node of this Location Discovery packet, the 3C Module in n 
uses the information in the packet’s 3C header to determine if there is a need to 
start the detection procedure to examine m’s behavior.  We will discuss when to 
initiate the misbehavior detection and the procedure for misbehavior detection in 
Section 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. If node m is confirmed to be misbehaving, the 
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3C Module of node n discards the packet (as punishment); otherwise, go to Step 
3.   
3. Node n keeps records of ongoing communication session in its Session Table.  If 
the arriving Location Discovery packet’s source_ID and destination_ID match 
an entry in node n’s Session Table (e.g., packet’s source_ID + destination_ID = 
session_ID), its 3C Module resets the time to live (TTL) timer of the 
corresponding entry.  Next, the Location Discovery packet is then passed on to 
the routing layer (Step 5). 
4. If the Location Discovery packet is not belonged to any ongoing session in the 
Session Table (e.g., packet’s source_ID and destination_ID ≠ session_ID), the 
3C Module updates the Session Table and increases the Forward Request 
Counter by one. The 3C Module then passes the Location Discovery packet to 
the routing layer for further processing (Step 5).  
5. Depending on different routing protocols (e.g., CLA or CBF protocol), node n 
can discard the packet, continue to forward (i.e., pass back down to lower 
layers), or initiate a reply procedure (i.e., reach the destination). In Figure 4, we 
show the routing protocol for CLA in the Routing Layer. 
3.3.3 Forward or Reply Location Discovery Packet 
Depending on the role of a node in a communication session (e.g., forwarding node or 
destination node), a node can forward the Location Discovery packet, reply to the 
Location Discovery packet with a Location Reply packet, or discard the Location 
Discovery packet according to its routing protocol.  A Location Reply packet is 
generated by a node’s Routing Layer when a Location Discovery packet arrived at a 
destination.  This destination node needs to reply the source node of the Location 
Discovery packet.  If a node is the destination, its Routing Layer generates a Location 
Reply packet and passes this reply packet to 3C Module.   
When Routing Layer submits a Location Discovery packet or a Location Reply 
packet to 3C Module, 3C Module processes the packet and updates the Forward 
Counter as follows: 
1. 3C Module determines if the Location Discovery packet or the Location 
Reply packet matches an entry in the Session Table.  To determine if the 
Location Reply packet matches an entry in the Session Table, 3C Module 
simply reverses the order of source_ID and destination_ID of this packet. If 
the packet matches an entry in the Session Table, go to Step 2.  Else, the 
packet is discarded because a malicious node can generate dummy packets to 
increase its Forward Counter to avoid detection.   
2. 3C Module increases the Forward Counter by one.  Then, the Location 
Discovery packet or the Location Reply packet is passed to MAC Layer.  
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 Figure 4. Update the counters during the Location Discovery phase.  
1101Ho Y.H., Ho A.H., Hua K.A., Xie F.: Cooperation Enforcement ...
3.4 Counters Update during the Data Forwarding Phase 
Once the location of the destination node is determined, the source node can start a 
communication session. In connectionless-oriented approach, nodes simply forward 
data packets without first establishing the link to the next node.  Any node that 
happens to be in the general direction towards the destination node can compete for 
the “right” to forward data packets.  When a source node s starts to send the data 
packet from routing layer to 3C Module, s’s 3C Module simply passes the data packet 
to the MAC layer without updating any counter.  
3.4.1 Receive Data Packet 
When a node n receives a data packet, its MAC Layer passes the data packet to its 3C 
Module. Then, n’s 3C Module updates the Forward Request Counter as follows: 
1. 3C Module determines if the data packet corresponds to a communication 
session in n’s Session Table. If so, go to Step 2.  Else, go to Step 3. 
2. n’s 3C Module resets the time to live (TTL) timer of the corresponding entry 
in the Session Table and passes the data packet to the routing layer.  Depend 
on different routing protocols, the data packet is either discarded or 
forwarded. 
3. If the data packet is not belonged to any ongoing session in the Session 
Table, the 3C Module updates the Session Table and increases the Forward 
Request Counter by one. The 3C Module passes the Location Discovery 
packet to the routing layer for further processing (e.g., discard or forward 
data packet). 
3.4.2 Forward Data Packet 
Depend on the routing protocol, the data packet is either discarded or forward (see the 
Routing Layer in Figure 4).  In connectionless-oriented approach, every node has 
equal probability of participate in the data forward procedure.  If the routing layer 
decides to forward data packet, it returns a data packet to 3C Module. The 3C Module 
processes the data packet and updates the Forward Counter as follows: 
1. 3C Module determines if the data packet matches any entry in the Session 
Table.  If so, it increases the Forward Counter by one and passes the data 
packet to the MAC layer.  
2. Else, the data packet is discarded.  We discard any packets that are not in the 
Session Table due to the same reason as discussed in Section 3.3.3. A 
malicious node can generate dummy packets to avoid evoking the 
Misbehavior Detection procedure. 
3.5 Initiate Misbehavior Detection 
By modifying its own routing protocol, a malicious node can intentionally drop (i.e., 
discard) packets to save its power.  However, in the connectionless-oriented approach, 
every node has an equal chance to participate in a forwarding process.  Thus, 3C 
Module needs to determine to whether to “invoke” the Misbehavior Detection 
procedure.  In order to determine if there is a need to invoke the Misbehavior 
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Detection procedure, 3C Module exams the 3C header in the Location Discovery 
packet and calculates two ratios, Forward Ratio (FR) and Request Ratio (RR) as 
follow: 
• Forward Ratioi  (FRi) =  
i
i
Counter Request Forward
Counter Forward     
• Request Ratioi (RRi) =
i
i
Counter Forward
CounterDiscovery  Location                
 , where i is the node that initiated this Location Discovery packet (i.e., the 
source  node).    
When a node n receives a Location Discovery packet from a node m, n’s 3C 
Module checks if m is the initiator (i.e., source node) of this Location Discovery 
packet using the information included in the packet (see Section 3.3).  If m is not the 
initiator, n’s 3C Module does not invoke the detection procedure. Then, this Location 
Discovery packet passes to the Counter Update procedure for further process (see 
Figure 4).  If m is the initiator of this Location Discovery packet, n’s 3C Module 
checks the 3C header included in this Location Discovery packet for the following 
conditions: 
1. FRm < FRn 
2. RRm > RRn * Initiate Detection Threshold 
If one of the above condition is true, n’s 3C Module broadcasts a 3C packet 
(including n’s 3C information) to its one-hop neighbor nodes.  When a node receives 
n’s 3C packet, it replies with its own 3C information.  When n receives its neighboring 
nodes’ replies, n calculates the Local Average Forward Ratio (LAFR).  This ratio is 
calculated as follow: 
 LAFRn =   
1
)(
1
+
+∑
=
k
FRFR
k
i
ni
, where k is number of neighboring nodes for n 
  (excluding m).  
In MANET, network conditions, such as density and congestion, can change 
dynamically.  Thus, the Local Average Forward Ration (LAFRn) is merely the local 
network condition around n.  If FRm ≥ LAFRn, it means that network condition at area 
of m might be congested which causes m not forward packets.  Thus, we do not need 
to invoke the Misbehavior Detection procedure.  On the other hand, if FRm < LAFRn, 
then m might be misbehaving by not forwarding packets.  In this case, n activates its 
Detection Mode.  Notice that all the neighboring nodes of m and n can activate its 
Detection Mode (but not at same time) because their Forward Ratios are similar. 
When a node activates its Detection Mode, it continues to forward for other nodes 
except for the suspicious node.  
To avoid evoking the Misbehavior Detection procedure, malicious nodes can 
initiate dummy packets to increase their own Forwarding Counter. Although, by 
doing so, malicious nodes defeat the purpose of saving power.  Nevertheless, 3C 
Module can prevent this misbehavior act by compare the outgoing packets against the 
Session Table.  If the packet does not match any entry in the Session Table, 3C 
Module discards this dummy packet.  
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3.6 Detection Mode 
The Detection Mode has two states: Listening-State and Detecting-State. Initially, a 
node in the Detection Mode is set to Listening-State. In the Listening-State, a node n 
waits for a random period of time. During this delay period of time, n does the 
following: 
1. If n hears a Detection packet from another node to test node m (i.e., the 
suspect node), n resets the delay time. A Detection packet is generated by 
Misbehavior Detection procedure to test a suspicious node.   
2. If n hears a Detection packet been forwarded by m, n exits the Detection 
Mode. By exiting the Detection Mode, n forwards m’s Location Discovery 
packet.  Similarly, all other nodes that are in their Detection Mode (Listen-
State) hear m forwarded the Detection packet will exist their Detection Mode. 
At the end of delay period, node n enters the Detecting-State. In the Detecting-State, n 
invokes the Misbehavior Detection procedure to determine if m is a malicious node.  
3.7 Misbehavior Detection Procedure 
The detection mechanism can be implemented as a software application as proposed 
in [Buttyan, 00] for lower cost. Alternatively, it can also be implemented as a build-in 
component of the temper resistant module for better security. Without loss the 
generality, we base our discussion on the latter option. 
The purpose of the Misbehavior Detection procedure is to detect uncooperative 
behaviors that result in disruption or degradation of data transmission. We focus on 
network layer attacks and do not address lower level threats such as physical layer 
jamming and MAC layer disruptions. The attacks contained by the Misbehavior 
Detection Module are as follows. First, the Misbehavior Detection procedure is 
invoked if there is a suspicion of dropping packets was detected during the location 
discovery phase.  Second, the Misbehavior Detection procedure captures malicious 
users who deliberately discard packets that they are obligated to forward either for 
selfish purposes or to mount denial of service attacks.   
When a node n invokes its Misbehavior Detection procedure to detect a suspect 
node m, the procedure is as follows: 
For CLA: 
1. n calculates a virtual link (see 1(a)) using the location information (i.e., cell 
ID) contained in m’s Location Discovery packet.  
2. Based on this virtual link, n generates a Detection packet (i.e., similar to 
regular data packet). The source location and destination location of this 
Detection packet are as follow: 
• Source node’s location (S_cell_ID) of this Detection packet is the cell 
behind of n, relative to m. 
• Destination node’s location (D_cell_ID) of this Detection packet is the 
cell behind of m, relative to n.  
3. Next, n broadcasts this Detection packet.  All the neighboring nodes of m are 
in Detection Mode and will not forward this Detection packet.  
4. n waits for a t period of time (t = maximum delay time in the routing layer). 
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5. At the end of the delay, if n does not receive the Detection packet forwarded 
by m (i.e., forward_ID = m), n repeats the process again for two times (total 
of 3 times). 
For CBF: 
1. n calculates a direction (see 1(b)) to a destination which invented by n using 
the location information (i.e., the position of m) contained in m’s Location 
Discovery packet.  
2. Based on the direction, n generates a Detection packet (i.e., similar to regular 
data packet). The source location and destination location of this Detection 
packet are as follow: 
• Source node’s location (the position of Source node) of this Detection 
packet is the cell behind of n, relative to m. 
• Destination node’s location (the position of Destination node) of this 
Detection packet is the cell behind of m, relative to n.  
3. Next, n broadcasts this Detection packet.  All the neighboring nodes of m are 
in Detection Mode and will not forward this Detection packet.  
4. n waits for a t period of time (t = maximum delay time in the routing layer).  
5. At the end of the delay, if n does not receive the Detection packet forwarded 
by m (i.e., forward_ID = m), n repeats the process again for two times (total 
of 3 times).  
If n receives the detection packet which is forwarded by m, n (and all the 
neighboring nodes of m) exits the Detection Mode.  n forwards m’s Location 
Discovery packet because m has passed n’s Misbehavior Detection procedure. If n 
does not receive the detection packet from m, n punishes m by discard m’s Location 
Discovery packet for period of tpunish = C × (LAFRn – FRm).  Thus, the punishment 
period is proportion to individual (misbehaving) node’s misbehaved level.  
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Figure 5. Virtual link for a Detection packet.  
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4 Experiment Results 
We conducted various experiments to verify the effectiveness of the proposed 3CE (3-
Counter Enforcement) scheme in enhancing performance of mobile ad hoc network.  
In this section, we first introduce the simulation setup and parameters.  We then study 
the proposed technique based on various performance metrics. 
4.1 Schemes Implemented 
We implemented three schemes, namely the reference scheme, the defenseless 
scheme and the proposed 3CE scheme, for performance evaluation. In the reference 
scheme, all the nodes act collaboratively and relay data for each other. In the 
defenseless scheme, a certain fraction of nodes are misbehaving as they failed to 
participate in forwarding procedure. In other words, these nodes discard any packets 
not destined at them.  No detection or prevention mechanism is implemented so that 
the network is totally “defenseless”. Finally, in the proposed 3CE scheme, 
misbehaving nodes are detected and punished. A malicious node can recognize itself 
is been punished when Location Discovery packets of the node has been dropped four 
consecutively times.  Once malicious nodes recognized themselves been punished, 
they participate in forwarding data to rejoin the network.  We varied the Initiate 
Detection Threshold (IDT) from 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, and 1.6.  This threshold determine 
percentage of a node require to participated in forward procedure in order not to 
initiate the 3C’s detection procedure.  For example, when the threshold set to 1.2, a 
node is allow of 20% of packet drop due to either network condition or mobility.  
4.2 Simulation Setup 
All the experiments were conducted using GloMoSim [Zeng, 98]. This simulator, 
developed at UCLA, is a packet-level simulator specifically designed for ad-hoc 
networks.  It follows the OSI 7-layer network communication model.  Although, 
popular simulators such as NS-2, OPNET Modeler, and GloMoSim provide advanced 
simulation environments to test and debug network protocols, we prefer GloMoSim 
due to its ability to handle high mobility of nodes and its scalability of handle large 
number of nodes and size of network area.  Unlike other simulators, GloMoSim uses 
the parallel discrete-event simulation capability provide by Parsec [Bagrodia, 98].   
Experiments were based on a mobile ad hoc network with 450 nodes and 90 
communication sessions within a 1500 by 1500 meter two dimensional space. Each 
communication session, source node and destination node are randomly selected (i.e., 
both normal nodes and misbehaving nodes).  Traffic applications are constant-bit-rate 
sessions.  Each data packet is 512 bytes. For the CLA, each grid cell is 100 by 100 
meter. The maximum delay time (t) is set to 2 seconds. All nodes employ 802.11 at 
the MAC layer. Each node has a radio range of about 250 meters. The random 
waypoint model was used to model the mobility of hosts.  Multiple simulation runs 
(100 runs per setup on average) with different seed numbers were conducted for each 
scenario and collected data were averaged over those runs. The total simulation 
duration for each run was 60 minutes (3600 seconds). We varied the number of 
misbehaving nodes (i.e., 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30% of total number of nodes) and node 
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mobility (i.e., 10 m/s to 25 m/s or 22 mile/hr to 56 mile/hr).  Initially, misbehaving 
nodes drop all the received packets.  Once misbehaving nodes been identified (i.e., all 
their Location Discovery packets are drop by other neighboring nodes), they behave 
normally until they are no longer identified as misbehaving nodes (i.e., their Location 
Discovery packets are forwarded by others).   
4.3 Metric 
In the experiments, we evaluated the proposed scheme based on the following six 
metrics: (i) Packet delivered ratio (P): The ratio of the data packets delivered to the 
destinations and the data packets generated by the CBR source. This measures the rate 
at which effective data transmission is performed. It is also a good indicator of the 
degree of collaboration among the nodes. (ii) Misbehaving node detection ratio (D): 
The ratio of the number of misbehaving nodes that were correctly identified to the 
total number of misbehaving node that have actually acted uncooperatively during the 
simulation. (iii) False accusation ratio (F): The ratio of the number of 3C Modules 
that incorrectly accused benign hosts to the overall number of misbehaving nodes that 
3C Module identified. (iv) Control overhead ratio (C): The ratio of the number of 
routing packets transmitted per distinct data packet delivered to a destination.  (v) 
End-to-end Delay (E): The number measured in milliseconds, includes detecting and 
processing malicious nodes delay, route discover latency, queuing delays, 
retransmission delay at the MAC, and propagation and transmission times.  This 
measures the total delay time from a sender to a destination (without communication 
sessions that belong to misbehaving nodes). (vi) Active Detection ratio (A): The ratio 
of the number of nodes activated their Detection Mode per misbehaving node’s 
location discover packet. 
4.4 Experimental Results 
We present the simulation results in this section.  
4.4.1 Packet Delivered Ratio 
By employing the proposed scheme, significantly more data can be successfully 
delivered to the destinations since nodes are now required to participating in data 
forwarding. Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict the practical scenarios where the number of 
malicious node is 10% and 20% of the total nodes. We observe in the case of fewer 
malicious nodes (less than 10%), the two protocols with 3CE (i.e., CLA-3C and CBF-
3C  with the Initiate Detection Threshold = 1.2) have very close throughput to the 
references CLA and CBF (i.e., CLA-Reference and CBF-Reference).  Notice that the 
performance of 3CE scheme is slightly less than the reference scheme.  This is due to 
two reasons: 1) misbehavior nodes are not 100% detected (i.e., see section 4.4.2, the 
3CE’s misbehaving detection ratio is about 87%); and 2) the false accusation ratio is 
not 0% (i.e., see section 4.4.3, some nodes are been miss identified as malicious 
nodes).  Also, notice that in the reference scheme, even all the nodes act 
collaboratively and relay data for each other, network condition (e.g., channel error, 
congestion, and mobility) are still the main causes for packet loss.  Never the less, the 
results show that the proposed 3CE scheme can minimize the effect of malicious 
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nodes to the network.  In both cases, the proposed technique improves the deliver ratio 
by more than 25% compare to the defenseless scheme.   
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Figure 6. Packet Deliver Ratio (P) with 10% Malicious Nodes. 
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Figure 7. Packet Deliver Ratio (P) with 20% Malicious Nodes. 
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In Figure 8 and Figure 9, we varied the Initiate Detection Threshold from 1.0, 1.2, 
1.4, and 1.6.  This mean a node is allow to drop from 0%, 20%, 40%, and 60% of total 
packets received without initiate 3CE’s detection mode.  We observe in the case of 
Initiate Detection Threshold = 1.6 (60% of tolerable drop rate), the performances of 
the proposed technique decreased to the defenseless scheme.  However, if we decrease 
the Initiate Detection Threshold = 1.0 (0% of tolerable drop rate), we do not gained 
additional improvement on the deliver ratio.  In fact by doing so, the performances of 
Misbehaving node detection ratio (D), False accusation ratio (F), Control overhead 
ratio (C), and Active Detection ratio (A) are decreased (see following sections).  
Based on the simulation results, the ideal Initiate Detection Threshold is 1.2 (20% of 
tolerable drop rate) with probability of error of 5%.   
Another important factor to the performance of packet deliver ratio is the speed of 
mobility.  Due to mobility of mobile hosts, addressing frequent and unpredictable 
topology changes is fundamental to MANET research.  As the mobility of node (e.g., 
speed) increase, the performance of all three schemes (i.e., 3CE, reference, and 
defenseless) are decreased. Similarly when we increased mobility and number of 
malicious nodes (see Figure 8 and Figure 9), the packet deliver ratio is also decreased 
as the result.  However, consider of mobility increased from 10 m/s (or 22 miles/hour) 
to 25 m/s (or 56 miles/hour), the deliver ratio is only drop average 20%.  Thus, the 
protocol is still suited for many applications (e.g., video and audio) with error 
correction code.  
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Figure 8. Packet Deliver Ratio (P) with 10% Malicious Nodes. 
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Figure 9. Packet Deliver Ratio (P) with 20% Malicious Nodes. 
4.4.2 Misbehaving Node Detection Ratio 
We list the results of misbehaving node detection ratio for various simulation 
scenarios in Table 1.  They indicate that the proposed misbehaving node detection 
mechanism is very effective.  In most cases with the Initiate Detection Threshold = 1.2 
(or 20% of tolerable drop rate), the 3CE’s detection ratio is about 87%.  However, 
when the threshold increased to 1.6 (60% of tolerable drop rate), the 3CE’s detection 
ratio decrease to about 50%.  This indicated that it important to select the acceptable 
threshold for the proposed technique.  The results (with correct threshold selected) 
demonstrate that on-demand misbehaving node detection is applicable. Since the 
proposed 3CE technique can adapt by the connectionless oriented approach, it is ideal 
for highly dynamic MANETs such as vehicle-to-vehicle networks.   
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CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF
96% 96% 89% 87% 77% 75% 59% 62% 96% 94% 88% 88% 75% 76% 55% 54%
93% 94% 93% 88% 77% 74% 60% 61% 92% 93% 91% 89% 77% 74% 54% 52%
94% 93% 91% 90% 75% 72% 58% 60% 93% 92% 85% 87% 73% 73% 54% 52%
93% 91% 91% 88% 68% 66% 52% 54% 91% 92% 87% 85% 66% 65% 50% 49%
CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF
90% 88% 83% 81% 71% 68% 52% 55% 84% 82% 81% 80% 68% 66% 52% 53%
92% 91% 86% 86% 71% 70% 52% 49% 85% 87% 88% 85% 65% 63% 60% 59%
89% 90% 89% 88% 68% 66% 48% 47% 87% 85% 87% 86% 58% 62% 54% 55%
88% 85% 84% 82% 59% 62% 45% 43% 86% 84% 85% 80% 50% 48% 34% 32%
Speed (m/s)
Tolerabe Drop rate (%)
Protocol
5% misbehaving nodes
10% misbehaving nodes
20% misbehaving nodes
20 25
0% 20% 40% 60% 0% 20% 40%
Speed (m/s) 10 15
Tolerabe Drop rate (%) 0% 20% 40% 60% 0% 20% 40% 60%
Protocol
5% misbehaving nodes
10% misbehaving nodes
20% misbehaving nodes
30% misbehaving nodes
60%
30% misbehaving nodes
 
Table 1: Detection Ratio (D) of CLA and CBF with 3CE. 
4.4.3 False Accusation Ratio 
We report the false accusation ratios of the proposed 3CE scheme under various 
scenarios in Table 2. We conclude that in all node mobility scenarios with the Initiate 
Detection Threshold = 1.2 (or 20% of tolerable drop rate) the false accusation ratio is 
very low.  We observe that this ratio is higher when the speed of nodes is increased. 
This is due to the fact that some of the suspect nodes moved out of the detection 
node’s radio range and were thus incorrectly classified by 3CE’s Misbehaving 
Detection procedure as misbehaving nodes, thereby lifting the false accusation ratio.  
In addition, by decrease the Initiate Detection Threshold, the false accusation ratio is 
increased.  The reason is that nodes drop packets due to the network condition were 
identify as misbehaving nodes.  Nevertheless, further investigation of simulation log 
files shows that under simulation configuration with the Initiate Detection Threshold = 
1.2, on average less than four nodes was incorrectly accused. Both results indicate that 
the proposed detection mechanism is able to detect most of the in-cooperative nodes 
with very low false accusation ratio. 
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CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF
8% 7% 0% 1% 3% 5% 8% 7% 5% 6% 2% 2% 5% 5% 5% 6%
8% 11% 1% 1% 4% 7% 8% 7% 7% 6% 2% 2% 5% 6% 7% 6%
9% 10% 1% 1% 5% 7% 8% 8% 9% 11% 1% 1% 6% 7% 9% 8%
12% 11% 2% 3% 6% 7% 8% 9% 17% 16% 2% 2% 10% 11% 11% 11%
CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF CLA CBF
7% 8% 3% 2% 6% 6% 7% 8% 12% 11% 2% 1% 7% 9% 9% 8%
8% 8% 2% 2% 7% 6% 8% 8% 14% 16% 3% 3% 8% 9% 9% 10%
10% 11% 2% 2% 7% 8% 10% 11% 18% 17% 2% 2% 11% 10% 12% 13%
13% 16% 4% 5% 11% 9% 10% 11% 23% 26% 5% 5% 11% 11% 13% 13%
Speed (m/s) 10 15
60% 0% 20% 40% 60%
Protocol
5% misbehaving nodes
10% misbehaving nodes
Tolerabe Drop rate (%) 0% 20% 40%
20% misbehaving nodes
30% misbehaving nodes
Speed (m/s)
Tolerabe Drop rate (%)
Protocol
5% misbehaving nodes
30% misbehaving nodes
20 25
0% 20% 40% 60% 0% 20% 40% 60%
10% misbehaving nodes
20% misbehaving nodes
 
Table 2: False Accusation Ratio (F) of CLA and CBF with 3CE. 
4.4.4 Control Overhead Ratio 
With 20% of malicious nodes and the Initiate Detection Threshold = 1.2 (or 20% of 
tolerable drop rate), we observe that the Control Overhead Ratio is higher when the 
speed of nodes is increased (see Figure 10). Similar to False Accusation Ratio, this is 
due to the fact that some of the suspect nodes moved out of the detection node’s radio 
range and were thus cause some nodes to invoke 3CE’s Misbehaving Detection 
procedure, thereby lifting the Control Overhead Ratio.  However, this is inevitable in 
most on-demand misbehaving node detection approaches.  With the Initiate Detection 
Threshold = 1.0 (or 0% of tolerable drop rate), we also observe that the Control 
Overhead Ratio is increased four times higher compare to the simulation results with 
the Initiate Detection Threshold ≥ 1.2.  Again similar to False Accusation Ratio, more 
incidences of Detection procedure were invoked to due to the low threshold.   
1112 Ho Y.H., Ho A.H., Hua K.A., Xie F.: Cooperation Enforcement ...
10 15 20 25
CLA-Defenseless 7.320570571 7.175176748 7.383105802 8.149621212
CBF-Defenseless 7.720570571 7.975176748 8.383105802 8.649621212
CLA-3C (0%) 18.6734 31.86853 54.90893542 77.8094545
CBF-3C (0%) 21.1322454 34.5854935 57.6236548 79.2306845
CLA-3C (20%) 10.221365 13.215687 15.541667 17.51347
CBF-3C (20%) 11.167514 14.75419 17.11469 19.65278
CLA-3C (40%) 9.0857 11.6643554 13.8875466 15.668974
CBF-3C (40%) 9.973648 12.787536 15.34678549 16.998589
CLA-3C (60%) 7.945623467 8.4553479 8.387475541 10.9975479
CBF-3C (60%) 8.287543239 8.076756242 10.78899665 12.1247094
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Figure 10. Control Overhead Ratio (C)  with 20% Malicious Nodes. 
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CBF-Reference 9.089984 10.578599 13.012299 21.11192145
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Figure 11. End to End Delay (E)  with 20% Malicious Nodes. 
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4.4.5 End-to-End Delay 
We report the increasing of end-to-end delay in Figure 11. With 20% of malicious 
nodes, we observe that the proposed scheme incurs minimum end-to-end delay. In 
most of cases, the length of delay increases approximately five milliseconds compared 
the reference schemes.  This can due to the fact that other nodes can continue to 
forward data packet while one node is detecting a malicious node.  Also, malicious 
nodes are unable to utilize the network resource once they are identified. Since we 
punish the misbehaving nodes by not forwarding their Location Discovery packet for a 
period of time, we did not include the communication sessions which the source nodes 
are misbehaving nodes.  In addition, the Initiate Detection Threshold does not affect 
end-to-end delay due the characteristics of the connectionless-oriented approach 
where anyone within the virtual router (i.e., CLA) or the neighboring node within the 
general direction of destination (i.e., CBF) can alternate in forwarding data toward the 
next virtual router or the next node.  
4.4.6 Active Detection Ratio 
With speed of 20 m/s and 20% of malicious nodes, we observe that the number of 
nodes activated Detection Mode per malicious node’s location discover packet (that 
attempt to establish a connection) becomes fixed even the number of nodes in the 
network increased from 450 nodes to 1800 nodes (see Figure 12).  In fact, if a 
malicious node is stationary, the maximum number of neighboring nodes that are in 
the Detection Mode (i.e., Detecting-State) is six (see Figure 13 (a)).  If a malicious 
node is moving at speed of 20 m/s, then the moving rang (i.e., a circle with radius of r) 
within the maximum delay time (t = 2 seconds) of the Detection Mode is as follow: 
  )(40)(2*)/(20* mssmtimespeedr ===  
With radio range of a node is 250 meters; the radius of circular area of the 
maximum area of neighboring nodes that can activate Detection Mode is as follow: 
  += rrDetection radio range )(290)(250)(40 mmm =+=  
Thus, the maximum number of neighboring nodes that are in the Detection Mode 
is seven nodes (see Figure 13 (b)). In order for a malicious node to move out of area 
where its neighboring nodes have activated the Detection Mode, the malicious node 
needs to travel of 540 meters (i.e., 290 m + 250 m).  With maximum moving speed of 
20 m/s, the time a malicious node to move out of this area is 27 seconds (i.e., 540(m) / 
20 (m/s)). Thus, the upper bond of Active Detection Ratio (A) is 7 nodes per 27 
seconds (or 0.26 nodes per second).  This confirms with our simulation study. In fact, 
the result in Figure 12 shows that our approach is able to adapt under high mobility 
(i.e., variety of applications – vehicular networks) and high density networks (i.e., 
scalable).  
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CLA -3C 3.215 5.58 6.689 7.232 7.654 7.954 8.021
CBF-3C 3.856 6.38 7.231 7.679 7.936 8.125 8.329
450 675 900 1125 1350 1575 1800
 
Figure 12. Active Detection Ratio (A) with 20 m/s and 20% malicious nodes. 
 
(a) 
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(b)  
Figure 13. Number of detecting nodes needed per malicious node at different speed. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed an efficient 3CE (3-Counter Enforcement) scheme to 
enforce collaboration for the connectionless-oriented approach (i.e., CLA and CBF) in 
mobile ad hoc network. Our contributions are as follows. 1) We introduce an on-
demand approach to misbehaving-node detection for the connectionless-oriented 
approach. Since the connectionless-oriented approach addresses highly dynamic 
networks (i.e., vehicle-to-vehicle networks), the existing misbehaving-node detection 
techniques are not suitable. Our approach supports this type of routing protocol under 
high mobility environments. 2) Each node maintains three counters to represent its 
own status (i.e., reputation).  Since nodes only determine their neighboring nodes’ 
counters information when a location discovery phase, no additional information is 
needed under a normal operation (i.e., nodes behave normally). 3) With large number 
of nodes and high mobility, the proposed approach enforces the cooperation on-
demand with minimum increase of delay.  
We conducted various experiments to study the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
proposed 3CE technique. The simulation results indicated that the proposed technique 
is very effective in enforcing collaboration.  The degree of collaboration is 
significantly strengthened as the network throughput is greatly improved compare to a 
defenseless network. Such improvement is accomplished with almost no false 
accusation of cooperative nodes. As of efficiency, the proposed scheme incurs 
minimum delay.  
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